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15

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 February 1959

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NUCLEAR TEST TALKS

The Soviet delegation at the nuclear test-cessation talks in Geneva on 30 January introduced a draft article on the key question of voting proce-

dures in the control commission.

The Soviet delegation had promised that, when the Western

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 February 1959

delegations presented their article on duration of the treaty, it would introduce a list of subjects on which Moscow feels decisions must be unanimous among the three nuclear powers. Presentation of this list before the West introduced its duration article was apparently designed both to strengthen Moscow's charge that the United States and Britain are blocking agreement by withholding their "long-promised" draft and also to support Moscow's campaign to impress public opinion with its serious negotiating posture. Moscow probably now hopes to focus debate on the question of duration of a test cessation, which it believes is the most vulnerable point in the Western position.

The Soviet article would make decisions on specified matters subject to the affirmative vote of not less than four members of the seven-man control commission, including "the initial parties to the treaty--the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom."

The matters listed were: revisions of the treaty; appointment and definition of the powers of the administrator; recruitment of higher level personnel; dispatching of an inspection group for an on-the-spot investigation, and action based on such investigation; revision of observation methods; determination of locations of control posts and of aircraft flight routes; and budgetary, financial, administrative and logistic questions. On 2 February Soviet delegate Tsarapkin, defending this veto-power provision, warned that Western insistence on any other approach to the voting question could cause the collapse of the negotiations.

Tsarapkin on 3 February repeated familiar arguments in defense of the veto right. He accused the West of putting forth proposals designed to allow frequent unjustified inspections in the USSR for purposes of espionage. He argued that the power of the control commission to accuse a party of treaty violation could be abused, leading to a breakdown of the treaty itself and to increased international tension. He said "there can be no agreement" not founded on unanimity of the three original parties, since the control organization would be "stillborn" if not based on the principle of "cooperation."

This warning of a possible breakdown on this issue contrasts with Tsarapkin's protestations in an informal talk with the Western delegates on 28 January that he and his government neither desire nor intend a break-off. The Soviet delegate's unusual action on 30 January summarizing the USSR's over-all position at the talks, however, suggests that he may have been preparing for a showdown.

In an apparent attempt to preserve the impression that Moscow is still anxious to negotiate an agreement, however, Tsarapkin accepted a British proposal for a working group on the technical aspects of control post staffing. Although, in the first meeting on 2 February, the Soviet representative attempted repeatedly to induce the British and American negotiators to admit the validity of the USSR's concern over the threat to its national security posed by international staffing, for the most part he confined his remarks to technical questions on the functions and qualifications of the control post staffs.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 February 1959

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The fact that Moscow's firm stand against the concept of truly international staffing has not changed was reaffirmed in plenary session later the same day when Tsarapkin introduced a "chart" on staffing of a typical control post, the activities of which would be closely controlled by the host country.

Khrushchev in his final speech to the party congress on 5 February reaffirmed the USSR's desire for agreement and charged that the United States and Brit-

ain were out to prevent such agreement by putting forth unacceptable proposals which would provide for a "full-scale intelligence network." He warned that "we shall never agree" to allowing the Western powers, under cover of control, to violate the sovereignty of the USSR. He drew a comparison between the surprise-attack talks and the present negotiations, charging that just as in the former they hindered any solution of the problem, in the latter they apparently intend to "drag things out" while they prepare public opinion for a disruption of negotiations. [REDACTED]

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